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Abstract 
In this paper I argue that one way of explaining what is wrong with hate speech is by critically 
assessing what kind of freedom free speech involves and, relatedly, what kind of freedom hate speech 
undermines. More specifically, I argue that the main arguments for freedom of speech (e.g. from 
truth, from autonomy, and from democracy) rely on a “positive” conception of freedom intended as 
autonomy and self-mastery (Berlin, 2006), and can only partially help us to understand what is wrong 
with hate speech. In order to fully grasp the wrongness of hate speech and to justify hate speech 
legislation, I claim, we need to rely instead on the republican idea of freedom as “non-domination” 
(Pettit, 1997, 2012, 2014; Laborde, 2008). I conclude that the hate speech used by religious citizens, 
even though it is a manifestation of their religious freedom, should be subject to the same restrictions 
that also apply to other citizens’ speech, because republicans should be concerned with the 
undominated (i.e. robustly secured) religious freedom of all religious citizens and, more generally, 
with the undominated freedoms of all citizens, including those who are victims of religious hate 
speech. 
 
Keywords 
Free speech, Hate speech, Religion, Non-domination, Republicanism 
2 
 
Introduction 
The relationship between religion and hate speech is complex. On the one hand, it has been 
central to recent discussions of hate speech directed at religious people, especially members 
of religious minorities. On the other hand, religious believers sometimes defend their use of 
derogatory and extreme speech against members of other religious faiths, or people with a 
certain sexual orientation, as part of their religious freedom. Recent examples include 
Swedish pastor Aaka Green’s likening of homosexuals with “cancer” (Anon. 2005); Tunisian 
preacher Muhammad Hammami’s anti-semitic remarks (Anon. 2012); and Belfast Pastor 
James McConnell’s description of Islam as “heathen” and “Satanic” (Anon. 2014). This 
renders an examination of the relationship between hate speech and religion especially 
important. 
Hate speech legislation currently in place across Europe and beyond is diverse, and 
underlied by a broad variety of legal rationales. Hate speech has been banned, for example, 
based on the view that it amounts to group defamation; that it involves negative stereotyping 
or stigmatisation of vulnerable minorities; that it incites hatred, or endangers public order; 
that it undermines the dignity of its victims, by humiliating or degrading them; that it 
infringes human rights, e.g. rights against discrimination and/or harassment; and that the 
mere expression of hatred is inherently wrong, regardless of its effects (Brown 2015). 
Similarly, the moral arguments in favour of hate speech laws are also diverse, and include the 
view that hate speech offends its victims; that it violates their dignity or autonomy; that it has 
negative effects on their health; that it hinders their personal development; or that it 
jeopardizes cultural diversity or democracy (Brown 2015). 
In this paper, I do not intend to provide an overall assessment of these arguments. My 
goal, instead, is to show that we can also explain what is wrong with hate speech by critically 
assessing what kind of freedom free speech involves and, relatedly, what kind of freedom 
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hate speech undermines. More specifically, I will argue that the main arguments for freedom 
of speech (e.g. from truth, from autonomy, and from democracy) rely on a “positive” 
conception of freedom intended as autonomy and self-mastery (Berlin, 2006), and can only 
partially help us to understand what is wrong with hate speech. In order to fully grasp the 
wrongness of hate speech and to justify hate speech legislation, I will claim, we need to rely 
instead on the republican idea of freedom as “non-domination” (Pettit, 1997, 2012, 2014; 
Laborde, 2008). I will conclude that the hate speech used by religious citizens, even though it 
is a manifestation of their religious freedom, should be subject to the same restrictions that 
also apply to other citizens’ speech, because republicans should be concerned with the 
undominated (i.e. robustly secured) religious freedom of all religious citizens and, more 
generally, with the undominated freedoms of all citizens, including those who are victims of 
religious hate speech. 
 
Freedom of speech and positive freedom 
Existing arguments for freedom of speech are ultimately grounded in a “positive” conception 
of freedom, i.e. freedom intended as individual autonomy and self-mastery, or freedom as 
collective self-government. This focus on positive freedom, I argue in this section, can only 
partially help us to understand what is wrong with hate speech.  
 
i. Free speech, truth, and the marketplace of ideas 
John Stuart Mill’s view that the absence of state censorship will enable the truth to emerge, 
thanks to the free exchange of ideas, remains one of the most accomplished and influential 
arguments in defence of free speech (Mill 2006). While freedom of speech, in Mill’s account, 
is undoubtedly a negative freedom, Mill’s rationale for it can be traced back to a positive 
conception of freedom. Indeed, by contributing to the discovery of truth, freedom of speech 
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also contributes “to the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being 
depends)” (Mill, 2006: 60). “The truth of an opinion,” Mill argues, “is part of its utility” 
(Mill, 2006: 29), and the latter should be considered as “the ultimate appeal on all ethical 
questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of 
man as a progressive being” (Mill, 2006: 17). 
The truth that freedom of speech enables people to discover contributes to utility both 
for society in general and for its individual members. Indeed, it is important to remember that 
for Mill the pursuit and discovery of truth should be accompanied by the use of our 
deliberative faculties. As Ten (1980) points out, while the “avoidance of mistake” could also 
be achieved without freedom of speech, i.e. through the government indoctrination of an 
uncritical people, it is the need to avoid the “assumption of infallibility” that most strongly 
justifies the need for free speech in Mill’s theory, demands the use of citizens’ deliberative 
faculties, and thus contributes to their flourishing as autonomous, rational and self-
determining (i.e. positively free) individuals. 
Mill does impose some constraints on free speech when the latter becomes a clear 
incitement to violence, as his famous example of the mob outside the corn dealer’s house 
shows (Mill, 2006: 64). This reflects Mill’s view that state interference with an individual’s 
freedom is permissible only when an action causes actual harm to others or when “there is...a 
definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public” (Mill, 2006: 93). The harm 
principle, therefore, can help us to understand what is wrong with incitement to hatred, as the 
latter may lead to violence, discrimination and injustice (Brown, 2008). However, not all hate 
speech is incitement to hatred. Instances of hate speech such as cross burning or displays of 
Nazi swastikas, for example, do not always involve the kind of harm (actual, imminent or 
likely) that for Mill would warrant state intervention. Mill’s harm principle, therefore, cannot 
help us to capture what is wrong  with these instances of hate speech. 
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But neither can Mill’s truth-based defence of free speech, and the ideal of positive 
freedom that underlies it, help us to fully understand what is wrong with hate speech. That 
ideal might justify regulating some categories of hate speech, i.e. those which are instances of 
“low-value” speech and do not engage our cognitive and deliberative faculties (Brink, 2008), 
e.g. “fighting words” which provoke an immediate, unreflective and often violent reaction 
from the hearer. Yet many forms of hate speech do contribute to the use of our intellectual 
faculties, and in this sense are instances of “high-value” speech (Brink, 2008). Think, for 
example, of cases of group defamation, which may contain statements of fact (e.g. “all 
Muslims are terrorists”) which, while false, can generate public debate and reflection on 
important social and political issues.  
It is true that, in many cases, these instances of “high-value” hate speech may still 
warrant state regulation, because they prevent their victims from participating in, and 
contributing to, the pursuit and discovery of truth. For example, the University of Michigan 
Discrimination and Harassment Policy, like many other university campus codes, allows the 
regulation of discriminatory harassment targeting individuals because of their religious 
beliefs, that “has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s 
employment or educational performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, offensive, or 
abusive environment for that individual’s employment, education, living environment, or 
participation in a University activity” (University of Michigan, 1992). This and similar 
instances of discriminatory harassment may contain valuable speech that could contribute to 
the discovery of truth (Brown, 2015: 114), and yet warrant restrictions if overall they impinge 
on (rather than contribute to) that goal. However, it is unclear how such truth-based 
restrictions can be justified by appealing to the idea of positive liberty, if those working and 
studying on university campuses have their right to participate in university activities (and, 
therefore, in the discovery of truth) formally protected. Or, to be more precise, the positive 
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freedom of the victims of hate speech will certainly be undermined if they are unable to fully 
exercise their formal rights to participate in various university activities (as that participation 
is what enables them to employ their deliberative faculties and contribute to the positive 
freedom-enhancing pursuit and discovery of truth), but only indirectly. What is directly 
affected by hate speech, however, is the victims’ ability to enjoy those formal rights (on 
which their positive freedom depends) securely and this, I will argue, requires appealing to 
the republican idea of freedom as non-domination.   
 
ii. Free speech, individual autonomy, and self-fulfilment 
The second major argument for free speech relies more directly than Mill’s on the idea of 
positive freedom. The claim, in this case, is that “[r]estrictions on what we are allowed to say 
and write, or (on some formulations of the theory) to hear and read, inhibit our personality 
and its growth. A right to express beliefs and political attitudes instantiates or reflects what it 
is to be human” (Barendt, 2005: 13). Some versions of the argument focus on the right of 
speakers as autonomous beings, e.g. what Ronald Dworkin calls the “right to moral 
independence” (Dworkin, 1981). Other versions of the argument, however, place more 
emphasis on the right of audiences. The most famous example is perhaps Thomas Scanlon’s 
view that “the powers of a state are limited to those that citizens could recognize while still 
regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents” (Scanlon, 1972: 215), and that 
“[a]n autonomous person cannot accept without independent consideration the judgment of 
others as to what he should believe or what he should do” (Scanlon, 1972: 216). Scanlon 
places a great emphasis on individual autonomy, and particularly on the view that “[a] person 
who acts on reasons he has acquired from another’s act of expression acts on what he has 
come to believe and has judged to be a sufficient basis for action. The contribution to the 
genesis of his action made by the act of expression is, so to speak, superseded by the agent’s 
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own judgment” (Scanlon, 1972: 212, original emphasis). Preventing hearers from being 
exposed to the speech of others just because their acting under the influence of that speech 
may lead to self-harm or harm to others would therefore constitute a serious infringement on 
the hearers’ autonomy.  
At first glance, the argument from autonomy and self-development seems to fail to 
provide any rationale for restricting hate speech directed at members of religious or ethnic 
minorities. Indeed restricting hate speech would not only curb the autonomy of speakers but 
also that of hearers, by implying that the latter (at least when they are adult and rational) are 
not capable of judging and critically assessing whatever hateful messages they are exposed 
to. One might argue, however, that hate speech which advocates or incites discrimination will 
undermine the autonomy and self-development of its victims, if such policies are eventually 
implemented (Yong, 2011: 398). Yet this argument relies on uncertain empirical foundations, 
i.e. it cannot be certain that hate speech will inevitably lead to the implementation of such 
policies. Moreover, in order to minimize the risk that such policies may successfully be 
implemented, it might be possible to put in place institutional and constitutional protections 
which would render their implementation highly unlikely.  
There is, however, a further objection to the view that the argument from autonomy is 
not consistent with any hate speech legislation. Some hate speech, that is, may permissibly be 
regulated because it “exercise[s]…undue influence on the listener” (Brown, 2015: 60), thus 
preventing them from autonomously deciding what to believe and how to act (Brown, 2015: 
60). This is consistent with Scanlon’s own revised version of the argument from autonomy, 
according to which autonomy “might sometimes be better advanced if we could shield 
ourselves from some influences” (Scanlon, 1979: 534), such as subliminal advertising (and, 
by extension, some forms of hate speech).  
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For example, when Jamaican-born Muslim cleric Abdullah el-Faisal was convicted of 
stirring up racial hatred due to his repeated claims about Jews, Hindus and Christians, Judge 
Beaumont made the following statement: 
In my judgment, your offending was aggravated by the fact that as a cleric you 
were sent to this country to preach and minister to the Muslim community in 
London, and so had a responsibility to the young and impressionable within 
that community at times of conflict abroad and understandable tensions in the 
communities here over the period which is spanned by the indictement (R. v. 
El-Faisal 2003, quoted in Brown, 2015: 65). 
 
While this statement suggests that at least some forms of hate speech may undermine the 
autonomous thinking and decision-making of at least some kinds of audiences, it is not clear 
that Judge Beaumont’s conclusions also apply to those who are not “young and 
impressionable.” Arguing that all categories of hate speech exercise an undue influence upon 
all audiences, that is, would de facto undermine the argument from autonomy entirely, i.e. by 
denying that any adult persons are capable of autonomously reflecting upon the hateful 
messages they are exposed to, and it would justify an extensive range of censorship measures 
in the realm of free speech. This is not a position that can be endorsed consistently with the 
argument from autonomy. Like the argument from truth, therefore, the argument from 
autonomy and self-development, which is grounded in a positive conception of freedom, only 
offers a partial justification for hate speech legislation.  
 
iii. Free speech and democracy 
When considering the argument from democracy, we move from a positive conception of 
freedom of speech focused on individual self-mastery to one which emphasizes instead the 
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idea of collective self-government. This is the theory defended, among others, by Alexander 
Meiklejohn (1961, 1979), for whom freedom of speech contributes to citizens’ understanding 
of political matters, which is necessary for their collective self-government. The latter, 
Meiklejohn argues, “can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, 
sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is 
assumed to express” (Meiklejohn, 1961: 255), and all of this requires the free circulation of 
ideas in the public sphere. The argument from democracy seems to demand that we reject 
restrictions on hate speech, especially when such speech presents politically relevant content 
(and much hate speech is, directly or indirectly, related to some political message).  
However, there might be two grounds, based on the argument from democracy, for 
regulating hate speech. On the one hand, one might embrace the idea of “militant democracy” 
and argue that hate speech should be regulated because it “is highly likely to destroy 
democracy” (Yong, 2011:  399). As in the case of the argument from individual autonomy, 
though, also in this case this kind of conclusion must rely on uncertain empirical foundations, 
i.e. the view that democracy will (or is very likely to) be undermined by hate speech. Yet the 
fact that democracy is still in place, for example, in the United States, despite the fact that 
hate speech is mostly unregulated in that country, suggests that this conclusion is empirically 
controversial. Moreover, as in the case of the argument from individual autonomy, in order to 
protect democracy we could enhance the constitutional and institutional protections that 
would render the implementation of anti-democratic policies very difficult (if not 
impossible), rather than silence the hate speech that advocates those policies.   
There is, however, a second sense in which democracy may be undermined by hate 
speech. Hate speech, that is, may have a “silencing effect” (Brown, 2015: 198) on its victims 
(e.g. members of religious or ethnic minorities), due to “fear for their personal safety or 
livelihood or as a result of an impaired sense of their status” (Brown, 2015: 198), thus de 
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facto excluding them from democratic deliberation and failing to treat them as free and equal 
participants in collective democratic self-government. As in the aforementioned case of 
discriminatory harassment in connection with the argument from truth, however, it is not the 
positive freedom of the victims of hate speech that justifies these restrictions, if such victims 
still preserve their formal rights to participate in public deliberation and collective self-
government. Or, to be more precise, the positive freedom of the victims of hate speech will 
certainly be undermined if they are practically unable to exercise their formal rights to 
contribute to democratic deliberation (as that contribution is crucial to their participation in 
collective self-government, which is a form of positive freedom), but only indirectly. What is 
directly affected by hate speech, however, is the victims’ ability to enjoy those formal rights 
(on which their positive freedom depends) securely and this, I will argue, requires appealing 
to the republican idea of freedom as non-domination.   
 
Free speech and non-domination 
In the previous section, I argued that the idea of positive freedom that underlies the three 
main arguments for free speech can only partially or indirectly justify restrictions on hate 
speech. What conception of freedom, then, can help us to understand more fully what is 
wrong with hate speech? The answer to this question can be found by appealing to the 
republican idea of freedom as non-domination. In republican political theory, freedom as 
non-domination refers neither to the absence of actual (or imminent) interference (“negative” 
freedom), nor to autonomy and self-mastery (“positive” freedom), but to the absence of 
“arbitrary” (Pettit, 1997) or “uncontrolled” (Pettit, 2012) interference or mastery by others. 
While being ultimately a negative kind of freedom, freedom as non-domination differs from 
mere negative freedom as it puts emphasis on those structural factors (institutional, legal, and 
social) which render one’s exercise of negative freedom (however broad the latter might be) 
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insecure and interference by others (the state, other people, etc.) unpredictable, capricious and 
unrestrained (even if such interference never actually materializes).  
In one of his more recent works Pettit defines “uncontrolled” interference as 
“interference that is exercised at the will or discretion of the interferer; interference that is 
uncontrolled by the person on the receiving end” (Pettit, 2012: 58). The advantage of using 
the term “uncontrolled” rather than “arbitrary,” Pettit argues, is that even in the presence of 
recognized non-arbitrary rules, “interference that conforms to rules, and is not arbitrary in 
that sense, may still be uncontrolled by you and can count as arbitrary in our sense” (Pettit, 
2012: 58). Furthermore, he claims, “uncontrolled” involves a more objective and descriptive 
meaning than “arbitrary,” “and people can agree on when it applies and when it does not 
apply, independently of differences in the values they espouse; it is not a value-dependent or 
moralized term” (Pettit, 2012: 58). The idea that both of Pettit’s formulations of “non-
domination” involve (despite the other differences between them), and which is crucial to the 
present analysis, is the view that freedom in the republican sense requires “security in the 
exercise of your basic liberties” (Pettit, 2014: 77). This security, according to Pettit, 
guarantees that “the members of a contemporary society are to enjoy the status or dignity of 
the free republican citizen” (Pettit, 2014: 61).  
The implications of the republican idea of freedom as non-domination for freedom of 
speech, and for hate speech more specifically, have been surprisingly overlooked (for an 
exception, see Power Febres, 2010). Yet the idea of non-domination can help us to 
understand more fully (i.e. than the idea of positive freedom) what is wrong with hate speech. 
More specifically, it can help us to understand that hate speech is wrong and should be 
regulated because even in the presence of legal and institutional protections against violence 
and discrimination, its victims do not enjoy their rights and liberties in a secure way. As a 
result, members of religious or ethnic minorities cannot live and act without fear that at some 
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point those who hate them might target them or even aim to deprive them of those very 
protections (i.e. basic rights and liberties) that guarantee some level of security for them. 
Even if these outcomes never materialize, the fear will still be there.  
 The wrongness of some of the examples of hate speech examined in the previous 
section, we saw, could only partially or indirectly explained by appealing to the idea of 
positive freedom. Instances of hate speech such as cross burning, the displays of Nazi 
swastikas, and discriminatory harassment on university campuses, for example, only 
indirectly undermine their victims’ positive freedom. What they do undermine directly, 
however, is their victims’ freedom as non-domination, i.e. their ability to enjoy their rights 
and liberties (which enable them to be positively free) with security, in a non-dominated way. 
This is what, more fundamentally, renders these and many other instances of hate speech 
wrong, and thus justifies their regulation. 
 It is interesting to note that the idea of freedom as non-domination implicitly underlies 
Jeremy Waldron’s (2012) influential defence of hate speech laws, even though Waldron 
himself never refers to republican political theory in his argument. According to Waldron, 
hate speech  undermines the public good of “assurance” which guarantees that “each person, 
each member of each group, should be able to go about his or her business, with the 
assurance that there will be no need to face hostility, violence, discrimination, or exclusion by 
others” (Waldron, 2012: 4). This “assurance”, Waldron argues, is especially important “for 
the members of vulnerable minorities, minorities who in the recent past have been hated or 
despised by others within the society, [and for whom] the assurance offers a confirmation of 
their membership: they, too, are members of society in good standing” (Waldron, 2012: 5). 
Hate speech, Waldron claims, undermines this assurance by reminding its victims that they 
should “[b]e afraid” (Waldron, 2012: 2). Like Pettit, Waldron links assurance and security 
with the idea of civic dignity, and argues that the assurance undermined by hate speech 
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guarantees citizens’ “social standing, the fundamentals of basic reputation that entitle them to 
be treated as equals in the ordinary operations of society. Their dignity is something they can 
rely on” (Waldron, 2012: 5). 
Grounding the justification for hate speech restrictions in the idea of freedom as non-
domination, it should be noted, does not imply that hate speech restrictions privilege hearers 
over speakers. This is not, in other words, a conflict between the freedom of speech of 
speakers, on the one hand, and the freedom as non-domination in general (i.e. not specifically 
concerning free speech) of hearers, on the other hand. Instead, each individual should be seen 
as both a speaker and a hearer, and freedom of speech as non-domination should be seen as 
the ability to speak without feeling vulnerable and insecure in one’s enjoyment of basic rights 
and liberties. Therefore those victims of hate speech who, due to the insecurity they 
experience, feel silenced and unable to express their views, are not simply experiencing non-
domination due to the freedom of speech of others. They themselves are lacking freedom of 
speech as non-domination. As Cass Sunstein points out, “[hate speech] create[s] fears of 
physical violence, exclusion, and subordination […] People confronted by hate speech may 
experience a form of ‘silencing’ in the sense that they are reluctant to speak” (Sunstein, 1993: 
186). It is important to stress again that the idea of positive freedom cannot fully capture what 
is at stake here. Unless speakers who are victims of hate speech have been formally deprived 
of their rights, they still enjoy the ability to autonomously make up their mind about what to 
believe and how to act in response to hate speech, and to participate in public debate 
accordingly. What they no longer enjoy, however, is the right to do all of this in a secure and 
non-dominated way, i.e. without the fear that they might at some point be deprived of their 
rights and liberties. 
In this sense it is true, as Eric Barendt points out, that hate speech “does not inhibit 
their [i.e. the victims’] legal freedom to communicate their views, in particular their right to 
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reply to racist abuse” (Barendt, 2005: 174). Yet this is beside the point. Even if one never 
experiences any legal interference with their speech, the threat represented by uncontrolled or 
arbitrary interference is sufficient to consider oneself dominated, i.e. insecure in one’s 
enjoyment of freedom of speech (and of other rights and liberties). Similarly, the fact that 
hate speech laws do restrict the negative freedom of speech of speakers is irrelevant to the 
question whether such restrictions are dominating. Hate speech legislation is certainly an 
instance of state coercive interference with negative freedom. Yet, like any other instance of 
state interference, it is not dominating “so long as it can be subjected to the effective, equally 
shared control of the people” (Pettit, 2014: 111).       
This reconstruction of freedom of speech as non-domination, and of its implications 
for hate speech, finds support in Pettit’s (1994) only dedicated analysis of free speech. The 
lynchpin of Pettit’s argument is that on the basis of a republican conception of freedom, free 
speech is protected not simply by limiting interference (e.g. by the state or other people) but 
also by securing “robust or resilient non-interference” (Pettit, 1994: 46), and that this can 
only be achieved if “a person is recognized by the law and the supporting culture as subject to 
protection” (Pettit, 1994: 47). The emphasis, that is, is on both legal rights and social norms. 
Importantly for the present analysis, Pettit claims that the legal right to free speech is 
not absolute and that it “may be limited to certain domains or may be conditional on certain 
provisos” (Pettit, 1994: 47). This view can also be found in Pettit’s more recent work (e.g. 
Pettit, 2014: 70). While Pettit does not elaborate on this point, this at least suggests that he is 
not a defender of free speech absolutism. This is not surprising. Freedom as non-domination, 
while being ultimately a kind of negative freedom, is different from mere negative freedom 
and it is compatible with forms of state interference, as long as these are not arbitrary or 
uncontrolled, and “provided that the limits and conditions [i.e. in the case of restrictions on 
free speech] are clear in advance to speakers” (Pettit, 1994: 47). In summary, limits on free 
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speech are justified when they secure freedom of speech as non-domination. Particular 
speech acts, including hate speech acts, may be limited in order to secure a republican 
framework in which everyone’s free speech is robustly protected. Republicanism therefore 
offers a theoretical and normative framework that helps us both to fully understand the 
wrongness of hate speech and to avoid the usual tension between the rights of speakers and 
those of hearers, by appealing to the importance of guaranteeing a robust freedom of speech 
for all. 
 
Laborde, critical republicanism and hate speech 
One important objection might be raised at this point against the argument defended in the 
previous section. As in the case of accounts of free speech grounded in a positive conception 
of freedom, it could be argued that the stronger the legal and institutional protections against 
violence and discrimination are, the weaker the infringement on the non-domination of 
members of religious or ethnic minorities resulting from hate speech is likely to be. Hate 
speech, in this sense, is innocuous as long as its victims are protected by criminal laws 
against the harm it threatens (e.g. Brown, 2008: 18).  
Yet this conclusion overlooks a key aspect of republicanism. This is the view that 
laws and institutions are not sufficient to guarantee non-domination if they are not backed by 
supportive social norms which contribute to people’s compliance with them. According to 
Pettit, “[t]he social norms that support laws, doubling the objective and subjective security 
that the laws underwrite, consist by most accounts in patterns of behaviour that people expect 
to be approved of for displaying and disapproved of for not displaying” (Pettit, 2014: 59). 
Cécile Laborde also highlights the importance of social norms, by stressing that republicans, 
unlike liberals, believe “that social attitudes and citizens’ ethos are as important as just 
institutions and laws in creating and sustaining the ideal society” (Laborde, 2008: 10).  
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Most importantly, the relationship between laws and social norms should be seen as 
“reciprocal” (Pettit, 2014: 59). This does not imply that social norms will definitely be 
internalized by all individuals since “people may or may not actually approve or disapprove 
on the pattern that others expect them to follow” (Pettit, 2014: 216, note 33). Yet what it does 
imply is that “the community will police potential offenders into compliance with the law by 
exposing each to the prospect of disapproval – and to the cost associated with disapproval – 
in the event they do not comply” (Pettit, 2014: 60). Social norms, in other words, provide 
“incentives” for people to act in certain ways qua rational agents.  
On these grounds, it might therefore be argued that permitting hate speech is not 
consistent with the aim of guaranteeing citizens’ non-domination as it allows the growth of 
social norms which are unsupportive of legislation against violence and discrimination, and 
which therefore prevent the robust enjoyment of rights and liberties (including freedom of 
speech) by members of religious or ethnic minorities who are the targets of hate speech. One 
might still point out, however, that the same problem might apply to hate speech legislation. 
We can implement hate speech legislation, that is, but that might still not guarantee the secure 
enjoyment of rights and liberties (including freedom of speech) by members of religious or 
ethnic minorities who are the targets of hate speech. This is because racists and fascists, and 
anyone else who engages in hate speech, might still endeavour to engage in it whenever they 
can get away with that (i.e. even in the presence of hate speech laws). In other words, the 
problem has just been moved one step backwards.  
In response to this, one might stress again that laws can contribute to the widespread 
endorsement of corresponding social norms, and that hate speech legislation might just have 
such an effect. However, if that is the case, then this would also apply to laws against 
discrimination and violence. The widespread endorsement of the social norms supporting 
such laws, that is, would guarantee the security and non-domination of members of religious 
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or ethnic minorities by acting as an incentive for people not to commit violent and 
discriminatory acts against members of religious or ethnic minorities, even in the presence of 
unconstrained freedom of speech which allows hate speech. In this sense, hate speech would 
cease to present a threat to its victims’ non-domination, since the latter would be already 
secured by laws against violence and discrimination and by the corresponding widespread 
social norms. How can we exit, then, this apparent paradox? The foregoing analysis seems to 
imply that from a republican perspective, which considers both laws and social norms as 
necessary in order to guarantee the security and non-domination of individual citizens, either 
hate speech is innocuous or hate speech legislation is ineffective. 
The solution to this apparent conundrum can be found in Laborde’s (2008) claim that  
the realization of the republican ideal of non-domination requires the acknowledgment “that 
the historical ethnicization of the public sphere...still weighs heavily on the present, and 
creates often intangible obstacles to the fair incorporation of minorities” (Laborde, 2008: 
233). This therefore requires “the de-ethnicization of the actually existing civil sphere and the 
de-stigmatization of the traits associated with minority groups” (Laborde, 2008: 233). On the 
basis of this claim, Laborde highlights the importance of a contextualist approach. For 
example, she claims, “[w]hile colour-blindness might be the ideal morality for an ideal 
society, it is not necessarily the appropriate response to racial discrimination in existing 
colour-coded societies. Thus, colour-conscious policies might well be the best way to de-
racialize society in the long term” (Laborde, 2008: 235).  
But similarly, while unconstrained freedom of speech might be the ideal option for an 
ideal republican society (in which there are laws against violence and discrimination 
supported by widespread social norms), the same might not be the case in those societies in 
which the public culture is strongly ethnicized, and in which this ethnicization prevents laws 
against violence and discrimination from being fully supported by widespread social norms, 
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especially with regard to members of religious or ethnic minorities. Hate speech, in this 
sense, may contribute in placing members of religious or ethnic minorities under an extra 
level of domination. This may be reflected not only in their fear that some of their fellow 
citizens may violate or remove laws that protect their rights and liberties when they can get 
away with it but also, for example, in their lack of trust in those who have the task to enforce 
those legal protections (e.g. the police, the judiciary, etc.).  
Hate speech laws can therefore be considered measures through which the public 
sphere can gradually be de-ethnicized and cleared of the dominating features that especially 
affect members of religious or ethnic minorities. Hate speech legislation should be seen as a 
symbolic measure which offers extra reassurance to vulnerable minorities, thus compensating 
for the extra level of domination of which they are victims, and which can contribute to the 
development of de-ethnicized social norms and a de-ethnicized public sphere. Under these 
new conditions, laws against violence and discrimination, and the corresponding social 
norms, may gradually become sufficient for members of religious or ethnic minorities to 
enjoy a robust freedom (including freedom of speech) as non-domination.  
In this sense, it could be argued that hate speech laws, under a republican framework, 
should be intended as temporary rather than permanent measures. Their aim, that is, is to 
“purify” the public sphere of those ethnicized social norms that, if untouched, would prevent 
members of religious or ethnic minorities from effectively using whichever tools of 
empowerment and voice the republican state provides them with. Alexander Brown, for 
example, makes a similar claim when he argues that “incitement to hatred legislation is best 
characterised as transitional. That is, it is most suitable for societies that need to promote 
better treatment across the board of racial and religious groups” (Brown, 2008: 18). 
Yet the idea of temporary or transitional hate speech laws is not entirely persuasive. It 
is not clear whether we can and should consider the ethnicized public sphere of contemporary 
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multicultural societies as a transient feature that may gradually vanish thanks to the 
implementation of temporary hate speech laws (and other similar measures). This conclusion 
seems to presuppose a somehow teleological and highly idealistic view which does not reflect 
in full the contextualist character of republican political theory. In other words, given the 
ever-changing diversity of contemporary societies, it is unlikely that at any point there will no 
longer be any vulnerable minorities whose secure enjoyment of basic rights and liberties is 
threatened by hate speech. While long-standing minorities may gradually see their non-
domination reinforced and secured, new minorities will emerge, as a result of migratory 
fluxes, internal fragmentation of existing minorities (or majorities), and demographic 
changes. This complex situation implies, on the basis of a republican theory of free speech, 
that hate speech laws should not be temporary but permanent. 
Laborde’s critical republicanism also offers another reason in support of hate speech 
laws, even in the presence of laws against violence and discrimination that are backed by 
widespread social norms. According to Laborde, there are “forms of domination which, being 
the product of indoctrination, manipulation, and norm internalization, remain invisible to 
their victims” (Laborde, 2008: 23). This aspect, she claims, is not fully captured by Pettit’s 
republicanism, for which there is domination only if there is “common knowledge among the 
people involved, and among any others who are party to their relationship” (Pettit, 1997: 59) 
(i.e. if people are generally aware) that someone has the ability to arbitrarily interfere with 
one’s choices. According to Laborde, this leads Pettit to overlook, or at least underestimate, 
cases of “backroom manipulation” (Pettit, 1997: 60), where “domination may affect a 
person’s interests even though she might be unaware of it, as in the well-known examples of 
the submissive housewife or the contented slave” (Laborde, 2008: 153).  
According to Laborde, manipulative non-domination prevents individuals from 
developing (and not merely from employing) their “capacity for minimal autonomy” 
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(Laborde 2008: 153), i.e. the “minimum discursive control or ‘voice’...[that allows them to] 
contest the power that is exercised over them” (Laborde, 2008: 152). When we are 
dominated, Laborde argues, “we are either deprived of the ability to form our own 
perspective (we are indoctrinated, manipulated, socialized into submissive roles) or, if we 
possess the capacity, we are prevented from using it (we are silenced, humiliated, 
threatened)” (Laborde 2008, pp. 153-4). In other words, “a capacity can be denied and not 
only dismissed through domination” (Laborde, 2008: 154, original emphasis). Pettit’s 
republicanism, Laborde claims, only captures the latter kind of domination.   
Laborde’s analysis therefore helps us to understand another important way in which 
hate speech can be dominating, in addition to the kind of domination that Pettit’s 
republicanism helped us to unveil. Hate speech, that is, may prevent its victims from even 
developing an awareness of the domination to which they are subject, and the capacity to 
contest it. This may happen, for example, when victims of hate speech internalize the hatred 
directed at them and display forms of self-hatred, as in the case of some Jews (Gilman 1990; 
Reitter 2012) or African Americans (Clark and Clark 1947). By manipulating and socializing 
its victims into submissive roles, hate speech may prevent them from making use of laws 
which protect them from discrimination or violence, even when such laws are also backed by 
widespread supporting social norms. This is the case, for example, of many women in 
western societies, who may be dominated (e.g. as a result of widespread patriarchal norms) 
despite the presence of socially endorsed laws against gender discrimination. The same could 
be argued about many victims of hate speech, including members of religious minorities.  
 
Hate speech, religious freedom, and non-domination 
My analysis throughout this paper has focused on hate speech directed at members of either 
religious or ethnic groups, especially minorities. Yet there is something distinctive about 
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members of religious groups which renders a republican account of hate speech especially 
useful to assessing their situation.  More specifically, members of religious groups may often 
resort to hate speech in order to express and propagate their faith. For example, some 
traditional or orthodox religious believers (Christians and Muslims alike) justify their 
sometimes extreme use of language regarding issues of sexual orientation as part of their 
religious freedom, as the examples illustrated in the introduction show. Therefore, while 
much of my analysis might also apply to non-religious victims of hate speech, it acquires a 
special importance when the victims of hate speech are religious believers, since the latter 
may sometimes also find themselves in the position of perpetrators, and hate speech may in 
their view be central to their exercise of religious freedom. The same cannot be said, for 
example, about members of racial or ethnic minorities, since we do not normally speak of 
“freedom of race” or “freedom of ethnicity.”  
There might often be a tension, therefore, between guaranteeing the non-domination 
of the victims of religious hate speech (who are themselves, sometimes, religious believers) 
and protecting the religious freedom of those religious individuals who make use of hate 
speech. Protecting the former, through hate speech legislation, might undermine the latter 
(and vice versa). Who, therefore, should be given priority in these cases?  
I contend that the hate speech employed by religious citizens should be subject to the 
same restrictions that also apply to other citizens. There are two reasons for this claim. First, 
there might often be other ways for religious citizens to convey their religious message, e.g. 
by preaching in ways that do not make use of hate speech. Restricting hate speech, therefore, 
may often have little if any negative implications for their religious freedom. For example, a 
religion’s disapproval of homosexuality could often be conveyed without likening 
homosexuals with “cancer” (Anon. 2005). Similarly, disapproval of another religion could 
often be expressed without labelling that religion “heathen” or “Satanic” (Anon. 2014). 
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Second, and more importantly, in a coherent republican framework religious freedom 
itself should be considered an aspect of freedom as non-domination. On the one hand, as in 
the case of freedom of speech, non-domination does not mean non-interference. One’s 
religious freedom, that is, could legitimately be interfered with (e.g. through hate speech 
laws) without such an interference being dominating (i.e. “arbitrary” or “uncontrolled”). On 
the other hand, and relatedly, republicans should also be concerned with the religious 
freedom of the victims of religious (or non-religious) hate speech who, we have seen, may 
often be themselves religious people (e.g. believers of a different faith). Their religious 
freedom (qua non-domination), that is, may be undermined by religious (or non-religious) 
hate speech, in the same way in which hate speech in general may undermine the freedom of 
speech (qua non-domination) of its victims. Republicanism, therefore, justifies restricting the 
religious freedom of some (conceived in liberal terms as a “negative” freedom) in order to 
protect a republican system where all enjoy undominated religious freedom, i.e. all exercise 
robust control over their religious freedom. Furthermore, even when the victims of religious 
hate speech are not themselves religious (e.g. non-religious homosexuals), republicans should 
be concerned with protecting their freedom as non-domination in all its different 
manifestations (e.g. sexual freedom, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, etc.).     
 
Conclusion 
The positive conception of freedom that underlies the main theories of free speech can only 
partially capture what is wrong with hate speech. The republican idea of freedom as non-
domination, I have claimed, offers a theoretical and normative framework that helps us to 
understand more fully the wrongness of hate speech, by appealing to the importance of 
guaranteeing a robust freedom of speech for all. Furthermore, I have argued, the hate speech 
used by religious citizens should be subject to the same restrictions that also apply to other 
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citizens’ speech, in order to guarantee the undominated freedom (including religious 
freedom) of all citizens, including the victims of religious hate speech. 
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